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Has Spam been Fried?
Why the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 Can't:
Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial
Electronic Mail and the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
John W. Daniel'
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE CAN-SPAM Act (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Por-
nography and Marketing Act) of 20032 is the first federal legislative
attempt to regulate unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE), also known as
spam. 3 Since its enactment, the Act has been overshadowed by criticisms
of its ineffectiveness. 4 Critics argue that the Act is ill-equipped to provide
the necessary tools to trace and physically locate spammers, and that, even
when the spammers are found, the Act fails to provide courts with personal
jurisdiction over them.5 While critics of the CAN-SPAM Act are quick to
identify these problems, there have been relatively few proponents of the
Act. This Note attempts to fill this void by, first, illustrating how the CAN-
SPAM Act creates an effective foundation in the war on spam as it works in
conjunction with other federal legislation regulating commercial communi-
cations and current case law and by, second, identifying future approaches
that Congress and courts may take in combating UCE.
i J.D. expected 2oo6, University of Kentucky. I would like to thank my parents, John and
Shelia Daniel, for their continued support and encouragement.
2 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM)
Act of 2oo3, 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7701-13 (2005).
3 This article treats spam and UCE synonymously. See generally David E. Sorkin, Technical
and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 325 (200 ) (analyzing the
differences between spam, UCE, and junk mail).
4 See, e.g., Thomas K. Ledbetter, Comment, Stopping Unsolicited Commercial E-Maih Why
the CAN-SPAM Act Is Not the Solution to Stop Spam, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 107 (2004); Sameh I.
Mobarek, Student Article, The CAN-SPAM Act of 2oo3: Was Congress Actually Trying to Solve the
Problem orAddto it?, 16 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 247 (2004); Lily Zhang, Note, The CAN-SPAM
Act: An Insufficient Response to the Growing Spam Problem, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 301 (2005).
5 See Ledbetter, supra note 4, at ii S; Amy G. Marino, Is Spain the Rock ofSisyphus?: Whether
the CAN-SPAM Act and Its Global Counterparts Will Delete Your E-mail, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 1021,
1035 (zoo5).
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This Note addresses two flaws of the CAN-SPAM Act and provides
some indication of how courts might actually be able to overcome these ap-
parent problems of the Act by applying traditional legal theories to Internet
law and by identifying potential steps Congress should take to make the
Act more effective. Part II provides the historical framework of spam by
detailing the numerous problems it has caused which prompted the need
for federal legislation.6 Part III reviews specific causes of action that plain-
tiffs have used to sue spammers based on separate sources: common law,
state legislation, and federal legislation under the CAN-SPAM Act.7 Part
IV addresses the first main hindrance to enforcing the Act: the difficulty
of physically locating spammers. s Part V provides a potential solution to
the second difficulty of obtaining personal jurisdiction over spammers for
the U.S. courts to obtain personal jurisdiction by comparing spammers and
website operators and analogizing the reasoning that has allowed courts to
obtain personal jurisdiction over website operators. 9 Finally, Part VI details
how the CAN-SPAM Act has, despite the two most publicized criticisms,
been used in lawsuits against spammers.' °
II. WHY SPAM TASTES So BAD
Although there is no definitive explanation of how the term "spam" be-
came synonymous with UCE, most literature cites a 1970 Monty Python
skit wherein "the word 'spain' is repeated to the point of absurdity in a
restaurant menu."" Others assert that the term spare describes the image
of putting SPAM® (the processed meat) into a fan and scattering useless
pieces everywhere.' 2 Some have reasoned that the term derives from an
6 See infra notes 10-24 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 25-73 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 74-129 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 133-198 and accompanying text.
io See infra notes 199-215 and accompanying text.
I I CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 E Supp. 1015, Ioi8 n.I (S.D. Ohio
1997); see also MARCIA S. SMITH, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: "JUNK E-MAIL": AN OVERVIEW OF
ISSUES AND LEGISLATION CONCERNING UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL ELECTRONIC MAIL ("SPAM"),
(April 15, 2003), http://www.usembassy.fi/pdfiles/RS2oo37.pdf ("It all started in early Internet
chat rooms and interactive fantasy games where someone repeating the same sentence or
comment was said to be making a 'spam.' The term referred to a Monty Python ' Flying Circus
scene in which actors keep saying 'Spain, Spam, Spam and Spam' when reading options from
a menu."); Dianne Plunkett Latham, Spam Remedies, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649,1649 n. I
(2001) (tracing the reference to spain to an episode of Monty Python's Flying Circus).
12 Todd H. Flaming, The Rules of Cyberspace: Informal Law in a New Jurisdiction, 85 ILL.
B.J. 174, 176 n.30 (1997).
[Vol. 94
CAN-SPAM ACT
analogy of the lack of functional value of UCE (or "junk mail") to the repu-
tation of SPAM® as lacking nutritional value.' 3
With approximately 140 million Americans, i.e. half of the United
States, regularly using e-mail,' 4 spam has become much more than just a
source of aggravation to Internet consumers and businesses alike. The vol-
ume of spam has exponentially increased year after year "threatening to
overwhelm not only the average consumer's in-box, but also the network
systems of ISPs, businesses, universities, and other organizations." '5 Spam
slows down the Internet's delivery speed and costs consumers time and
money since web users must pay for the extra time spent online deleting
unwanted UCE.'6 The increase in spam has only exacerbated this problem.
For example, "e-mail security firm MX Logic reports that spain accounted
for 8o percent of all e-mail in 2004, up from 62 percent in 2003."'7 Aside
from the annoyance of deleting spam, most spare is false. In April 2003,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reported that a study found that
sixty-six percent of the spam analyzed contained some kind of fraudulent
or misleading information either in the e-mail's routing information, the
subject line, or the body of the message."
Initially, internet service providers (ISPs) bear the burden of the in-
crease in spam by needing to update anti-spam software and suffering the
consequences of a slower network as they are forced to devote more re-
sources to blocking the increasingly large amount of spam. The United
States' largest ISP, America Online, reported in May 2003 that it blocked
13 Robert Craig Waters, An Internet Primer: (Part 11), 44 FED. LAW. 72, 72 (March/April
1997)-
14 S. REP. No. io8-Io2, at 2 (2003), as repintedin 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349.
15 Id. at 2-3. In September 2001, Internet analysts estimated that spam accounted for
only eight percent of all e-mail. As of April 2002, the estimate rose to eighteen percent, and by
the end of 2003 over half of all e-mail was expected to be unsolicited commercial e-mail. Id.
at 2-3. MX Logic, an anti-spain vendor and research group, "found 67 percent of all e-mail to
be spam in February" 2004, and by November 2004 the group reported that "75 percent of all
e-mail was spam.... Grant Gross, Is CAN-SPAM Working?: One year after it went into effect, many
say the nation's antispam law is ineffective, PC WORLD, Dec. 28, 2oo4, available at http://www.
pcworld.com/news/article/o,aid, I 19058 ,oo.asp.
16 See Derek D. Simmons, No Seconds on Spam: A Legislative Prescription to Harness
Unsolicited CommercialE-mail, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 389, 393 (1999).
17 Tom Spring, 2005 Inbox Forecast: Despite better technology and tougher laws, expect to keep
fingering that Delete key next year, PC WORLD, Dec. 20, 2004, available at http://www.pcworld.
com/news/article/o,aid, I 18985,oo.asp.
18 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FALSE CLAIMS IN SPAM: A REPORT BY THE FTC's
DIVISION OF MARKETING PRAcTICES 10 (2003), available at http:llwww.ftc.gov/reports/spam/
o3o429spamreport.pdf. The FTC also grouped spain based on categories and prevalence with
four categories comprising over half of all spam: investment or get-rich-quick "opportunities"
(20 percent); pornographic websites or adult-oriented material (18 percent); credit card or
financial offers (17 percent); and health products and services (I percent). Id. at 2.
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2.4 billion spam messages per day, approximately eighty percent of its daily
inbound e-mails2
9
While ISPs front the costs of combating spam by paying for advanced
spain-filtering technology, creating extra e-mail storage for customer in-
boxes, and increasing network bandwidth,20 these costs are eventually fun-
neled to the end consumer.' Some experts estimate that spain costs indi-
vidual Internet consumers worldwide $9.4 billion each year. 2  It has been
estimated that United States businesses lose between $io billion to $13
billion per year due to spam, mostly from lost productivity, network system
upgrades, unrecoverable data, and increased personnel costs. 23 Some au-
thorities predict that spam will cost companies as much as $198 billion by
20O7,
4 emphasizing the need for improved regulation.
III. AT-rEMPTS AT FRYING SPAM
Initially, plaintiffs used common law causes of action to bring claims against
spammerss such as trespass on chattels,2 6 breach of contract, 7 and even
19 S. REP. No. lO8-102, at 2-3. The second largest e-mail provider, Microsoft, "report-
ed ... that its MSN mail and Hotmail services combined block up to 2.4 billion spam messages
each day. Earthlink, the third largest ISP in the United States, reported a 500 percent increase
in inbound spam over the past i8 months." Id. at 3.
20 See Tom Spring, Spar Weapons of Tomorrow: Internet firms turn to technology, not law, to
fight the avalanche ofspam, PC WORLD, Mar. 1, 2004, available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/
article/o,aid, i 14995,oo.asp.
21 See id. ISP Bellsouth's director of project management estimated that spam costs a
provider three dollars per in-box per year. See also S. REP. No. o8- 102, at 6 (noting that "USA
Today reported in April [20031 that research organizations estimate that fighting spam adds an
average of $2 per month to an individual's Internet bill").
22 S. REP. No. 1o8-102, at 6.
23 See Press Release, MX Logic, MX Logic Finds That Only 3 Percent of Unsolicited
Commercial Email Complies with CAN-SPAM Law (Fed. 10, 2004), http://www.mxlogic.
comlnews-events/press_releases/oz2 l o o4_CAN-SPAM.html.
24 See Bob Sullivan, Spain Wars-How UnwantedEmail is Buryingthe Internet, Aug. 6, 2003
http://www.spamsolutions.net/io59.asp (citing a study by the Radicati Group).
25 See Latham, supra note i i, at 1651
26 See generally Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Applicability of Common-Law Trespass
Actions to Electronic Communications, 107 A.L.R.5th 549 (2003-o4); CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (plaintiff ISP seeking a cease-and-desist
order to stop the defendant from using its network to send unsolicited e-mail advertisements
to plaintiff's customers). But see, Adam Mossoff, Spam--Oy, What a Nuisance!, 19 BERKELEY
TECH L.J. 625, 640-41 (2004) (citing Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) for the
proposition that the cause of action for trespass on chattels as used against spammers has
reached its zenith).
27 See Monique C.M. Leahy & Sonya M. Duchak, Cause ofActionforBreach of Contract and
Related Causes of Action Against Bulk E-Mail Senderfor Damages Due to "Spamming", 13 CAUSES
OF ACTION 20 597 (2005); see also, Hotmail Corp v. Van Money Pie Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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nuisance.21 Plaintiffs then began using state and federal statutes directed
at other forms of electronic communications and analogized UCE to these
forms.29 State legislatures were the first to statutorily respond to the spam
problem in various ways such as providing individuals with a cause of ac-
tion directly targeting UCE. 30 Congress then followed by enacting the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.
A. State and Federal Legislation
Clever plaintiffs used several statutes as the basis for causes of action in-
cluding false designation of origin,31 dilution of interest in service marks
under the Latham Act,32 and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act 33 by exceeding authorized access and impairing computer facilities.34
Thirty-eight states have enacted statutes directly targeting span. 35 To
protect individual consumers, the statutes have used a variety of tech-
niques for regulating UCE36 such as requiring "ADV." to be the first four
characters of the subject line37 to signal to recipients that the e-mail is an
advertisement, prohibiting "false or misleading information in the subject
line," ' providing mechanisms whereby a person may opt not to receive
1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that evidence would likely show that defendant breached e-
mail service agreement by using plaintiff's e-mail services to facilitate sending spam).
28 See Mossoff, supra note z6, at 646-58 (explaining why a spam cause of action could
rely on nuisance claim).
29 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
31 See 15 U.S.C. § I I25(a)(I) (zooo); see also America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 E
Supp. 2d 444, 449 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting that "[tihe unauthorized sending of bulk e-mails has
been held to constitute a violation of the Lanham Act").
32 15 U.S.C. § I I25(c)(I) (zooo); see also America Online, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 449-5o
(plaintiff claimed dilution of mark because of "association with defendants' bulk e-mail prac-
tices").
33 I8 U.S.C. § 1030 (zooo).
34 See America Online, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d at 450-51 (holding defendant's unauthorized
spamming to be a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, I8 U.S.C. §§ Io3o(a)(z)(C),
(5)(C), by intentionally accessing a computer without authorization resulting in damage to
plaintiff's computer network).
35 See generally DAVID E. SORKIN, SPAm LAws: UNITED STATES: STATE LAws: SUMMARY
(zoo5) http://www.spamlaws.com/state/summary.html (summarizing state anti-spain statutes);
Scot M. Graydon, Much Ado About Span: Unsolicited Advertising, the Internet, and You, 32 ST.
MARY's L.J. 77, 98-io6 (2000) (discussing the various ways state statutes have attempted to
regulate spam).
36 See Graydon, supra note 35, at 98-io6.
37 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(g) (West 1996) (repealed 2003); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN § 6-2.5-103(4) (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18--25oi(e) (2005).
38 815 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5 II/IO(a)(ii) (West 2005);WAsH. REV. CODE§ I9.190.020(I)(b)
(2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6G-2(2) (LexisNexis 1999).
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span, 39 and, perhaps the most liberal and consumer-friendly provision, im-
posing violations for spammers who send UCE to state residents.4°
As cases against spammers filtered through the judicial system, the wide
variation among requirements of different states and the nature of e-mail
being capable of dissemination across numerous state borders created com-
plex issues regarding compliance with states' statutes. Furthermore, courts
were confronted with issues regarding whether the court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over nonresident-defendant spammers, such as when
an Internet user in one state attempted to bring suit against a spammer
located in another state. 4' It quickly became apparent that effective regula-
tion of UCE would require broad jurisdiction that only federal legislation
could provide.
4
Before the CAN-SPAM Act, the federal government had enacted leg-
islation regarding other types of unsolicited commercial communications.
For example, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA)
regulated commercial telephone and fax solicitations. 43 The TCPA specifi-
cally targeted the use of the telephone and fax machines44 for unsolicited
commercial communications, but some plaintiffs have used the TCPA to
attack UCE as well.45 The TCPA not only provides plaintiffs with a cause
of action, but it also provides precedent for upholding Congress's authority
to regulate commercial speech, including UCE, 46 by providing the rationale
as to why Congressional legislation of electronic communication passes
constitutional scrutiny.
47
In Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC,4s the plaintiffs alleged that the TCPA
unconstitutionally restricted commercial speech in violation of the First
39 See Graydon, supra note 35, at 114.
40 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.2 (West 1996).
41 See, e.g., Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 878 A.2d 567 (Md.
2005) (holding that defendants who had sent spam to business e-mail addresses were not
subject to general or specific jurisdiction in Maryland).
42 See Graydon, supra note 35, at 105.
43 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (zooo) (prohibiting the use of autodialers and prerecorded mes-
sages).
44 See § 227(b)(I)(C) (prohibiting an advertiser from using "any telephone facsimile ma-
chine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited
advertisement").
45 See John Magee, The Law Regulating Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail: An International
Perspective, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 333, 347 (2oo3) (referencing
Destination Ventures as the case that paved the way for "expansive interpretation of the act to
include [UCE]").
46 See Gary S. Moorefield, Note, Spain-It's Just Not For Breakfast Anymore: Federal
Legislation and the Fight to Free the Internet from Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, 5 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 1o para. 24 (1999).
47 Magee, supra note 45, at 347-
48 Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 E3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Amendment. 49 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the Act was constitutional, finding that the banning of unsolicited adver-
tising through facsimiles met the government's interest in preventing the
shifting of advertising costs to consumers.50
While many scholars have discussed the imminent constitutional chal-
lenges which the CAN-SPAM Act will face in the upcoming years5' based
on the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech,5 2the CAN-SPAM
Act will most likely be upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congressional
authority under the reasoning in Destination Ventures and the similarities
between the TCPA and the CAN-SPAM Act. As the infiltration of the In-
ternet and the use of e-mail continue to increase, advertisers capitalize by
using the relatively cheap method of sending out large amounts of e-mail
to promote their products. Thus, the CAN-SPAM Act will be held to be
constitutional because the government's interest in preventing spammers
from shifting the costs of advertising to Internet users 3 is just as strong as
its interest in preventing advertisers from shifting costs to fax recipients54
Attempts at federal regulation directly targeting UCE is not new. Al-
though over twenty-five bills have been proposed in recent years, the
CAN-SPAM Act is the only bill that passed through Congress.55
49 Id. at 55-56.
50 Id.
51 See generally Marc Simon, The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003: Is Congressional Regulation of
Unsolidted CommerialE-mailConstitutional?, 4 J. HIGH TEcH. L. 85 (2004) (predicting that the
CAN-SPAM Act will be held constitutional against a First Amendment challenge).
52 See generally Elizabeth A. Alongi, Note, Has the U.S. Canned Span?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.
263, 287 (2004) (surmising that the CAN-SPAM Act will be upheld if challenged under the
First Amendment on commercial free speech grounds because the government has an interest
in preventing fraud and it is narrowly tailored to address that interest).
53 See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text (explaining the extensive costs associ-
ated with spain passed on to consumers and businesses alike and that these costs led Congress
to enact the CAN-SPAM Act).
54 See Destination Ventures, Ltd., 46 F3d at 56.
55 See DAVID E. SORKIN, SUMMARY OF PROPOSED FEDERAL SPAM LEGISLATION (2005), http://
www.spamlaws.com/federal/index.html (detailing over twenty-five bills that were introduced
into Congress from 1999-2004 but were not enacted). Congressional proposals in 2003 in-
cluded: Criminal Spam Act of 2003, S. 1293, io8th Cong. (2003) (criminalizing the sending
of predatory and abusive e-mail); Wireless Telephone Spam Protection Act, H.R. 122, io8th
Cong. (2003) (prohibiting the use of wireless telephone systems to transmit unsolicited com-
mercial messages); REDUCE Spam Act (Restrict and Eliminate the Delivery of Unsolicited
Commercial Electronic Mail or Spam Act) of 2003, H.R. 1933, io8th Cong. (2003) (criminaliz-
ing sending UCE with false or misleading header information); SPAM Act (Stop Pornography
and Abusive Marketing Act), S. 1231, io8th Cong. (2003) (prohibiting transmission of unso-
licited commercial electronic mail to persons who place their e-mail address on a national
No-Spam Registry and imposing requirements on content to prevent fraud and deception);
Reduction in Distribution of Spain Act of 2003, H.R. 2214, Io8th Cong. (2003) (requiring
identification for advertisements and opt-out instructions); Anti-Spain Act of 2003, H.R. z55,
io8th Cong. (2003) (requiring identification of advertisements and opt-out instructions).,The
2005- 2oo6]J
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B. The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003
The CAN-SPAM Act places several prohibitions and requirements on
senders of UCE. For example, the Act prohibits the use of materially false
or misleading header information, 6 deceptive subject headings, 7 and fail-
ure to contain a functioning return e-mail address~5 Unless the recipient
has given affirmative consent to receipt of the message, the e-mail message
itself must provide clear and conspicuous identification that the message
is an advertisement, clear and conspicuous opportunity to "opt-out" by de-
clining to receive further commercial e-mail messages, and a valid physical
postal address.5 9
The Act provides several mechanisms for enforcement 6° including a
cause of action for a state attorney general to seek to up to $2 million in
damages. 6' While the Act does bestow some federal agencies with the au-
thority to assert a cause of action,62 it noticeably excludes private individu-
als from bringing suits under CAN-SPAM. 63 Criminal penalties under the
Act are available under I8 U.S.C. § 1037.64
The CAN-SPAM Act incorporates techniques developed by state stat-
utes to create one federal law that preempts any inconsistent state law that
"expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial mes-
sages. ' ' 6s The Act explicitly states that it does not preempt "State laws that
are not specific to electronic mail, including State trespass, contract, or tort
law; or other State laws to the extent that those laws relate to acts of fraud
or computer crime." 66 Thus, the extent to which the CAN-SPAM Act actu-
ally preempts state law is unclear. For example, in August 2004, the Virginia
attorney general indicted several defendants with felony violations of the
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 was passed by the Senate on November 25, 2003, and the House of
Representatives on December 8, 2003. President Bush signed the bill on December 16, 2003
with an effective date of January I, 2004.
56 See 15 U.S.C.S § 7704(a)(I) (2005).
57 See § 7704(a)(2).
58 See § 7704(5)(a)(3)(A).
59 See § 7704(a)(5).
6o See infra notes 130-198 and accompanying text.
61 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 77o6(f).
62 See § 77o6(b).
63 The Act does not expressly prohibit actions by e-mail consumers; however, it does
expressly authorize a cause of action for ISPs. See § 77o6(g).
64 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7 7o3(b)(i) (approving the U.S. Sentencing Commission's amend-
ment of sentencing guidelines to provide appropriate penalties for violations of 18 U.S.C. §
1037, which addresses criminal sanctions for sending large quantities of unsolicited electronic
mail). Contra Arminda B. Bepko, Note, A State-By-State Comparison of Spam Laws, 13 MEDIA L.
& PO'Y 20, 53 (2004) (stating that the CAN-SPAM Act does not contain criminal provisions).
65 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(I) (2005).
66 § 7707(b)(2). See also Bepko, supra note 64, at 5o; infra notes 197-215.
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Virginia statute governing the transmission of UCE without any reference
to the federal CAN-SPAM Act.
67
Enforcing the CAN-SPAM Act is delegated to three main entities: the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), state attorneys general, and ISPs. 6 The
FTC has the primary responsibility of enforcing the CAN-SPAM Act.
69
Congress deemed violation of the Act an unfair or deceptive Act or prac-
tice,7° and the FTC is given the "same means, and with the same juris-
diction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions
of the FTC Act were incorporated and made a part of [the CAN-SPAM
Act]."" State attorneys general also are granted standing to seek remedies
against spammers who violate the Act.72 ISPs may bring suits when a spam-
mer transmits unlawful UCE over the ISP's facilities or violates the Act by
harvesting e-mail addresses from a website or online service operated by
the ISP.7
3
IV. ADDRESSING WHY THE CAN-SPAM ACT
CAN'T "CAN THE SPAM"
Although the CAN-SPAM Act went into effect on January I, 2004,74 MX
Logic, an e-mail-security firm, measured CAN-SPAM compliance each
67 See Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. 355,371 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004) (denying a motion
to dismiss predicated on constitutional challenges to the Virginia statute regulating UCE,
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (2004)). The court's order acknowledged the CAN-SPAM Act,
stating that "the Virginia statute can be harmonized with ... the [CAN-SPAM Act]." Jaynes, 65
Va. Cir. at 369-70.
68 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7706 (2005).
69 See § 77o6(a)-(c). Subsection (a) grants enforcement jurisdiction to the Federal
Trade Commission if the violation is deemed an unfair or deceptive Act or practice by the
Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57 a(a)(I)(B) (200o) (per-
mitting the FTC to "prescribe rules which define ... acts or practices which are unfair or
deceptive"). Subsections (b) and (c) provide several agencies with enforcement capabilities
subject to jurisdictional and authority limitations provided by their own statutory grants: the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Department of Transportation,
the Department of Agriculture, the Farm Credit Administration, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communications
Commission.
70 § 77o6(a). Under the Act, offenses are treated as though they are violations of an
FTC Trade Regulation Rule promulgated under Section 18(a)(i)(B) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B).
71 S. REP. No. io8-102, at 20 (2003), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349.
72 § 7706(0(1).
73 S. REP. No. ,o8-102, at 21.
74 CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. lO8-187, § I6, 117 Stat. 2699, 2718. The por-
tion of the Act providing for the "Do Not E-mail Registry" however did not go into effect on
2oo5-2oo6]
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month since the law went into effect by examining a random sample of
io,ooo UCEs each week and found that ninety-seven percent of UCEs
failed to comply with the Act75 "During 2004, monthly compliance ranged
from a low of 0.54 percent in July to a high of 7 percent in December."
76
FIGURE I
CAN-SPAM COMPLIANCE, 2004-2005
100%
2004
fl Spam volume
*CAN-SPAM
compliance
.90%
2005 JAN FEB MAR AP MAY J G S OT V EC
SOURCE: E-mail traffic through the MX Logic Threat Center Courtesy MX Logic Inc.
January 1, 2004. Id.
75 See Press Release, MX Logic, Inc., On One-Year Anniversary of CAN-SPAM Act,
MX Logic Reports 97 Percent of 2004 Spam Failed to Comply with the Law; Spam, Other
Email Threats Will Continue to Increase in 2005 (Jan. 3, zoo5), http://www.webwire.com/
ViewPressRel.asp?ald=869 (quoting MX Logic chief technology officer Scott Chasin assaying
"While we applaud the intent of the CAN-SPAM Act, clearly it has had no meaningful impact
on the unrelenting flow of spare that continues to clog the Internet and plague inboxes.... In
fact, the overall volume of spain increased in 2oo4, and we fully anticipate continued growth
in 2005.").
76 Id.
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While there is no simple explanation for the continued lack of compli-
ance, two of the reasons that have generated significant attention in the lit-
erature involve the Act's inability to track down spammers in cyberspace
77
and the fact that, even when the spammer's location can be determined,
complex due process issues may hinder a court's ability to exercise personal
jurisdiction.7
8
A. Catch Me If You Can
The first main problem with enforcing the CAN-SPAM Act is the inability
to physically locate the spammer. If the CAN-SPAM Act has had any ef-
fect on spamming, it has only caused spammers to move their operations
offshore or use open relays79 thus appearing to have moved offshore. In fact,
"[b]etween December 31 [, 20031 and January 2[, 2004], AOL noticed a IO
percent jump in spam originating overseas," s a clear indication that some
spammers took the CAN-SPAM Act seriously enough to "move" their op-
erations outside of the United States. Therefore, one of the most pressing
obstacles to overcome in the effort to decrease spam is the need to enhance
the technological and legal capabilities so that authorities may trace UCE
to its source.
Between eighty to ninety percent of all spam sent worldwide is untrace-
able to its actual source.8 ' Of the spam which does claim to come from a
certain area of the world as determined from the message's header informa-
tions'2 (which can be dubious itself), the majority of spam appears to be sent
through e-mail servers located outside the United States83 which further
77 See Latham, supra note i i, at 165 1.
78 See Kenneth C. Amaditz, Canning "Spar" in Virginia: Model Legislation to Control Junk
E-Mail, 4VA. J.L. & TCH. 4,'1 52 (i'99), available at http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphics/
vol41homeart4.html.
79 See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
8o Tom Spring, Why Spammers Love the CAN-SPAA Law: Antispam laws make some span-
ming legal and do little to quell the onslaught, PC WORLD, Jan. 19, 2004, available at http://www.
pcworld.com/news/article/o,aid, i i4363,oo.asp.
81 Brightmail president Enrique Salem stated in written testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation that ninety percent of the
e-mail it analyzed was untraceable. See Hearing on Unsolicited Commercial Email Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, io8th Cong. 6 (2003) (written statement by
Enrique Salem, president, Brightmail, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/sa-
lemo5z 103.pdf.
8z Header information is defined as "the source, destination, and routing information
attached to an electronic mail message, including the originating domain name and originat-
ing electronic mail address, and any other information that appears in the line identifying, or
purporting to identify, a person initiating the message." 15 U.S.C.S. § 7702(8) (2005).
83 See Hearing on Unsolicited Commercial Email Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, io8th Cong. 6 (2003) (written statement by Enrique Salem, president,
Brightmail, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/salemo5 2103.pdf.
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complicates the jurisdictional problems. As the diagram below illustrates,
Brightmail,84 an electronic-communications security firm, found that sixty
percent of spam comes from e-mail addresses assigned to Europe (includ-
ing ten to twelve percent from Russia), and sixteen percent originates in
Asia. Although North America receives over half of all spam sent each day,
only eleven percent is directly traceable to North America. 85
FIGURE 2
WHERE SPAM PURPORTS TO ORIGINATE
r% Africa
I I% North America
6% cani ,, ,,,16% Asia
6% Australia/Oceania
6% South America
SOURCE: http.Ilcommerce.senate.gov/pdflsalemo 2 o3/pd
In September 2004, the FTC submitted the report "A CAN-SPAM
Informant Reward System: A Report to Congress," as required by the
CAN-SPAM Act,8 outlining two potential avenues for tracing spammers:
the "electronic trail" and the "money trail."' 7 Tracing the electronic trail is
84 "Brightmail analyzes data it collects from its 'probe network', more than a million con-
tinually monitored e-mail addresses seeded in ISPs around the world. These e-mail addresses
never send out e-mail and have never been used in e-commerce, but still attract 300-350
million e-mail messages per month, ioo percent of which can be classified as 'unsolicited'." S.
Rep. No. 1o8-102, at I n.2.
85 See Hearing on Unsolicited Commercial Email Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, io8th Cong. 6 (2003) (written statement by Enrique Salem, President,
Brightmail, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/salem052i03.pdf.
86 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 7709 (zoo5). SEP
87 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A CAN-SPAM INFORMANT REWARD SYSTEM: A REPORT
TO CONGRESS 11 (2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/rewardsys/o4o9I6rewardsysrpt.
pdf [hereinafter CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System].
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typically less fruitful than the money trail because of the numerous ways
that spammers are able to disguise the true origin of their messages.s
i. Technological Evasion: Tools of a Spammer. -Spammers have a wide ar-
ray of technological methods to evade those seeking to trace their e-mails:
spoofing, open relays, hijacking servers, and zombie and bot networks.s9
Spoofing, or "forged spamming," involves providing false e-mail header
information so that an e-mail "appear[s] to come from an address other
than the one from which it actually came."90 Any undeliverable messages
return to the person whose address was spoofed rather than to the spam-
mer, which causes its own problems.9' A variation of spoofing occurs when
a spammer references a prestigious domain name in the subject line or text
of the message in hopes that the recipient will believe that the sender is a
reputable business and give more attention to the e-mail.92 A third form of
spoofing involves routing an e-mail through an unsuspecting ISP to create
an electronic trail so that the ISP appears to be involved in sending the
message. 93
An open relay is "an unprotected, or 'unsecured,' email server that is
configured to accept and transfer email on behalf of any user anywhere,
including unrelated third parties."94
If a spammer sends junk e-mail directly, network managers can trace back
the connection and deal with the problem. If, instead, the spammer relays
the mail, they may be able to obscure their identity. Even if the spammer
can't hide completely, they will deflect a significant portion of the com-
plaints away from themselves and towards the administrators of the hi-
jacked host.95
88 See generally Latham, supra note I I, at 1655-1657 (detailing a technical explanation of
the complexities of tracing the source of e-mail and why it is so difficult to trace the source
of spam).
89 See CAN-SPAA Informant Reward System, supra note 87, at 12-13.
90 Id. at 12.
9I Id. "Not only can a spammer send out millions of spoofed messages, but any bounced
messages-messages returned as undeliverable-will flow to the person whose address was
spoofed rather than to the spammer. As a result, an innocent e-mail user's inbox may become
flooded with angry, reactive e-mail, and the innocent user's Internet service may be shut off
due to the volume of the complaints." Id.
92 See Latham, supra note I I, at 1650.
93 Verified Complaint at 6, Earthlink, Inc. v. John Does 1-25 and John Does 26-50, No.
o4-CV 3142 (N.D. Ga. filed Oct. 27, 2004), available at http://www.earthlink.net/about/press/
spamlawsuit.pdf.
94 CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System, supra note 87, at 12.
95 MAIL ABUSE PREVENTION SYSTEM LLC (MAPS), WHAT Is TIRD-PARTY MAIL RELAY?
2 (2001), http://security.ucdavis.edu/ mail relay.pdf. [hereinafter MAIL ABUSE PREVENTION
SYSTEM].
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Intentionally misconfigured e-mail servers complicate tracing e-mail to
its original sender.96 The server is open in that it allows incoming mes-
sages, originally sent from anywhere, to be relayed through the server to
the desired recipient and in the process, the true origin of the e-mail is
disguised. 97 For example, a spammer located in the United States is able
to use an open relay that is located in any other country to make the spam
appear as if it originated in that other country.9
Spammers may also "hijack" a server in a practice known as domain-
name hijacking, which allows massive amounts of mail to be relayed through
an unsuspecting server and causes spam to appear to have originated from
the hijacked server.9 Hijacking allows the spammer to "launder their junk
e-mail through third-party relays to enable them to slip through the spam
filters" because even the spam filters see the spam as being from a repu-
table server because of the domain name used in the "from" address. -
Spainmers may also use devices known as worms or viruses to convert
an open or compromised proxy server into a "zombie drone." 0. A zombie
drone is a computer that is infected with software, which causes the com-
puter to spew out span or serve as a relay or proxy for spam, completely
unknown to the computer's owner.'0 2 When numerous zombie drones are
controlled by the same spammer, it creates a bot-network, which may have
as many as 400,000 drones.'0 3 When each drone in the network is instructed
to generate or relay spam, the aggregate spam-generation rate can be im-
mense.'0 4 Technology experts expect the number of zombie bot-networks
96 See CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System, supra note 87, at 12.
97 See MAIL ABUSE PREVENTION SYSTEM, supra note 95, at 2.
Spammers use relays to increase the number of messages they can spew.
A lowly PC sitting at the end of a phone line can only pump out a lim-
ited number of messages. If, however, the spammer can grab a hold of a
high-powered mail host, then they can push through hundreds of times
more junk mail. Further, if the spammer can relay through several mail
servers in parallel, they can flood the net with extraordinary amounts of
junk mail.
Id.
98 See CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System, supra note 87, at 12.
99 Latham, supra note I I, at 165o.
IOO Id.
io David Bender, Data Protection: Three "Hot Topics", in INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (PLI's TENTH ANNUAL), at 48 (PLI Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 2909, 2004).
102 Id. at 47-48.
103 See DAN BONEH, DIFFICULTIES OF TRACING SPAM EMAIL 5 (Sept. 9, 2oo4), http://www.
ftc.gov/reports/rewardsys/expertrptE boneh.pdf [hereinafter Boneh Report].
IO4 See id. at 5-6. For more information regarding bot networks and zombie drones that
promulgate spain, see Jeff Gelles, Next big step in thwating spammers; FTC's next big step to fight
spammers, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 16, 2oo4, at CI; Saul Hansell, Spammers Can Run But They
Can't Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at Ci; Frank Hayes, ISPs' Span Fight, COMPUTERWORLD,
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to increase, "providing the infrastructure for a significant increase in the
volume of spam that can be distributed."'' 05 Zombie drones and bot-net-
works are an increasingly favored method of spamming.' ° An MX Logic
report in April 2004 estimated that thirty to fifty percent of spam came
through zombie drones; by November and December 2004, that amount
had increased to sixty-nine percent.'0 7
Finally, spammers may use untraceable Internet connections that can-
not be linked to an individual or physical location, such as Internet users
who connect "through free (or stolen) wireless connections."' 0, In addition,
certain universities have on-campus networks which do not require users
to identify themselves before logging on, thus allowing users to send e-mail
anonymously.109 Spammers "may also purchase ISP roaming access using
false names and untraceable payment methods." 1b0
2. Tracing the Money TraiL-As an alternative to the electronic trail, the
FTC may attempt to trace the money trail to find who is financially ben-
efiting from the spare.' For example, a novice spammer may register his
e-mail address under his real name and address. Even if the name and
address of an e-mail account holder may be false, the account holder's IP
address and payment records may provide useful investigative leads." 2
However, investigating the money trail is especially hindered by pri-
vacy limitations regulating the kinds of evidence that may be obtained."13
For example, the FTC "cannot compel information about the volume of
email sent from an email account or copies of complaints an ISP has re-
ceived about the email account holder."1 4 Compelling copies of e-mail in
the spammer's e-mail account is difficult because of various court decisions
interpreting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)."5
Mar. 15, 2oo4, http://computerworld.com/managementtopics/management/helpdesk/story/o,
io8o,9i 182,oo.html.
105 Press Release, MX Logic, Inc., On One-Year Anniversary of CAN-SPAM Act, MX
Logic Reports 97 Percent of 2004 Spam Failed to Comply with the Law; Spam, Other
Email Threats Will Continue to Increase in 2oo5 (Jan. 3, 2oo5), http://www.webwire.coml
ViewPressRel.asp?ald=869 (noting that in the weeks prior to the press release "MX Logic
discovered ... [that] as much as 69 percent of daily spam came from zombie PCs").
io6 Id.
107 Id. See Gross, supra note 15.
io8 Boneh Report, supra note 103, at 9.
1o9 See id.
iio Id.
ini See CAN-SPAiif Informant Reward System, supra note 87, at i i.
112 See id. at 15.
113 Seeid.
114 Id. at 14 n. 27.
115 See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F3d 1 066 (9th Cir. 2004), amending, 341 F3d 978 (9th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 48 (2004) (reversing dismissal of a claim under the ECPA
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The ECPA" 6 places several limits on the types of information that the
FTC can obtain from electronic communications services and remote com-
puting services such as ISPs."7 During an investigation, the FTC "is often
unable to obtain essential information about an investigative target's finan-
cial transactions from third parties, such as banks, credit card processors,
and other payment processors." "' Spammers also may use offshore proces-
sors and banks which can be beyond the reach of the FTC's compulsory
process, making its job even more difficult." 19 Legislation before the Senate
and House of Representatives would help the FTC reach offshore pay-
ment processors and banks in several ways, including by broadening re-
ciprocal information sharing, expanding cross-border investigative coopera-
tion, and providing for international agreements to accomplish these goals
when necessary.120
The need for further action by Congress is evident. The numerous ways
of avoiding detection illustrate that tracing either the electronic or money
trail leads to many dead ends.
3. More Technological and Legal Advancements Are Needed to Address
Evasion. -Numerous technological advancements have slightly eased the
problem, but these advancements have led to temporary solutions because
spammers are quite adaptable in their ability to circumvent advances in an-
tispam technology. 2' One of the newest technologies developed by Micro-
soft, "smart" systems, takes into account the spammer's ability to continu-
ally develop new mechanisms to slip through filtering systems.'22 These
systems learn from data and grow smarter over time, thereby confronting
the ability of spammers to use new tactics to avoid filters. 23 Some U.S.
senators have suggested charging Internet postage by taxing each piece of
mail that is sent electronically.14
where defendants had improperly subpoenaed copies of plaintiffs' e-mail in separate litiga-
tion).
i16 i8 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2703 (2000).
117 See § 2703(c)(2). Under the ECPA, the Commission can use a civil investigative de-
mand to find six types of information to a domain hosting an e-mail account that was used to
send spam. See also CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System, supra note 87, at 14 n.27.
118 CAN-SPAM Informant Reward System, supra note 87, at i 5.
i i9 Id. at 15 n.34.
120 SeeS. 1234, io8th Cong. (2004); H.R. 4996, io8th Cong. (2oo4).
121 See generally Sorkin, supra note 3, at 344-56 (discussing several technical advance-
ments that can be implemented by Internet users and ISPs including filtering and blocking).
122 See Ledbetter, supra note 4, at 125.
123 See id.
124 See Grant Gross, Will Taxing E-Mail Stop Spain?: Congress considers international treaty,
tough laws, opt-out registries, and more, PC WORLD, May 22,2003, available at http://www.pcworld.
comlnews/article/o,aid,i i o837,oo. asp. Senator Mark Dayton told the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation that he thinks "it's worth looking at some very, very
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The advancements have largely been focused on preventing spain from
being delivered to the recipient or decreasing the overall levels of spam.
These technologies and the CAN-SPAM Act lack any means to actually
locate those people responsible for the spam. Legislators and developers
of antispam technologies need to spend more resources on orchestrating a
constitutionally permissible means of locating spammers such as a reduc-
tion in the barriers that hinder the FTC's investigations.
Even though the lack of legislation and technology is an obvious detri-
ment to obtaining any type of judgment against a spammer, this has not
inhibited lawsuits from going forward. For example, ISP EarthLink filed
a complaint in March 2004 against seventy-five "John Does" which were
split into five groups classified by the content of their spam: "Prescrip-
tion Drug Spammers," "Mortgage Lead Spammers," "Cable Descram-
bier Spammers," "University Diploma Spammers," and "Get Rich Quick
Spammers." 125
In April 2004, the FTC announced the first CAN-SPAM cases against
Phoenix Avatar and Global Web Promotions. 26 In March 2005, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois approved a settlement
between the FTC and Phoenix Avatar, fining the company $230,000 for
sending millions of e-mail messages advertising their "bogus" diet patch.'
2 7
Though Phoenix Avatar did not admit guilt, the FTC charged that Phoenix
Avatar violated two sections of the CAN-SPAM Act (among other laws).2'
The court found that Phoenix Avatar sent commercial e-mail messages that
contained materially false or misleading header information in violation of
the CAN-SPAM Act, failed to provide clear and conspicuous notice of the
opportunity to receive further commercial electronic mail messages from
small charge for every e-mail sent, so small that it would not be onerous for an individual or
business that has regular (e-mail) use, but it would be a deterrent for those who are sending
millions and even billions of these e-mails." Id.
125 Press Release, Microsoft, America Online, Earthlink, Microsoft and Yahoo! Team Up
to File First Major Industry Lawsuits Under New Federal Anti-Spam Law (Mar. 10, 2004),
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2oo4/maro4/03- i oCANSPAMpr.asp.
iz6 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Announces First CAN-SPAM
Act Cases (April 29, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo4/o4/04o429canspam.htm. A copy of
the criminal complaint against Phoenix Avatar is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/zoo4/o41
o4o4z9phhoenixavatarcriminalcmplt.pdf. A copy of the complaint against Global Web is avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselistlo4z3o86/o4o428globalwebcomplaint.pdf.
127 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Diet Patch Sellers Settle CAN-SPAM
Charges (Mar. 31, 2o05), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo5/o3/phoenix.htm. As part of the settle-
ment, the fine was suspended, requiring Phoenix Avatar to only pay $20,000, provided that
Phoenix Avatar complies with other provisions of the settlement, such as complying with the
CAN-SPAM Act and failing to make false or misleading statements in their advertisements.
Id.
IZ8 Id.
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the sender, and failed to include a valid physical postal address of the send-
er in violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 7704(a)(5)(A).29
V. OBTAINING PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SPAMMER
Even when the physical location of the spammer is found, a second major
obstacle in enforcing the CAN-SPAM Act is finding a court which is able to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant-spammer. 3° Because this
issue is further complicated by the international aspects of the Internet, the
scope of this Note is limited to a defendant-spammer found operating in
the United States.'3'
It must be noted that personal jurisdiction is not a problem in all situ-
ations. A defendant is subject to suit in federal district court in the district
in which the defendant resides.' 32 Thus, the FTC or resourceful ISPs have
little trouble in pursuing a defendant under the CAN-SPAM Act because
these entities can pursue the defendant in his home state. However, the
Act grants standing not only to the FTC and the large ISPs but also to any
"provider of Internet access service adversely affected by a violation." This
allows small ISPs to bring a civil action in any district court with jurisdiction
over the defendant. 33 ISPs vary greatly in terms of size and financial capital;
it seems logical that smaller ISPs may not have the financial resources to
locate and bring suit against a defendant spammer in the state in which the
defendant resides. Furthermore, it could be argued that smaller ISPs have
more of an interest in pursuing spammers because smaller ISPs have more
limited capabilities to deal with the negative consequences of spam.' 34 The
question becomes whether a district court, other than the court in the juris-
diction in which the defendant resides, may exercise personal jurisdiction
129 See Default Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Relief as
to Defendants Phoenix Avatar, LLC and DJL, LLC at 3-4, FTC v. Phoenix Avatar, LLC,
No. o4C-2897 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/o423o84/
050331 defludgo423o84.pdf.
130 See Amaditz, supra note 78,I 52.
131 Obtaining personal jurisdiction over a defendant spammer located outside the United
States has not been addressed by domestic courts. Given the numerous ways that spammers
are able to conceal their identities, it is apparent that any real effort at combating sparn will
take an international effort. There has been no attempt to apply the CAN-SPAM Act to inter-
national spammers. Ubertiv. Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1995), provides an example of how
a court might find personal jurisdiction over a spammer operating outside the United States.
In determining that the court had personal jurisdiction over the international defendant, the
court examined whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the state and whether it
would be reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over a company located in Italy. Id. at 1358.
132 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2000).
133 15 U.S.C.S. § 77o6(g)(i) (2005).
134 Seesupra, Part II.
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over the defendant because the defendant has sufficient contacts with the
jurisdiction via the defendant's spamming activities.
Arguably, the CAN-SPAM Act caters to the large ISPs by effectively
giving them a competitive advantage over smaller ISPs since the large ISPs
are more likely to have the resources to bring suit against spammers in the
jurisdiction where the spammer resides, whereas smaller ISPs are less likely
to have the financial capabilities to sue in any jurisdiction. As an alternative,
the small ISP may either attempt to bring suit in the jurisdiction in which
the ISP resides or lobby the state attorney general to bring a civil action on
behalf of the ISP in a U.S. district court of appropriate jurisdiction.'35
An ISP or state attorney general may bring an action in any U.S. district
court in which venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.136 Section 139i(b)
is controlling because jurisdiction is based on a federal statute. It provides
that a civil action may be brought in either
(1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside
in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district
in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the
action may otherwise be brought.137
It is apparent that any of the persons given standing under the CAN-
SPAM Act may file suit where the defendant spammer resides.'38 The issue
then becomes determining how subpart (2) of Section 1391 affects the ju-
risdictional analysis: what is considered "a judicial district in which a sub-
stantial part of the events ... occurred' 39 when dealing with UCE.
In answering the question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion is appropriate over spammers, courts will either have to rely on tradi-
tional personal jurisdiction analysis or create a new analysis that is tailored
to cyberspace or spamming in particular. Under the traditional framework
of personal jurisdiction, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant if either general or specific jurisdiction exists.-40 General
jurisdiction may be found when a defendant has engaged in systematic and
continuous activities in the forum state.' 4' Specific jurisdiction reaches to
the limit of due process. 142 This Note focuses on specific jurisdiction, which
135 See § 77o6(f)(i).
136 § 77o6(f)(7)(A).
137 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2ooo).
138 See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
139 § 1391(b)(2).
140 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 4o8, 414 nn.8-9
(1984).
141 See id. at 414-16.
142 See David L. Stott, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Constitutional
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may be used when general jurisdiction is inappropriate and the plaintiffs
cause of action arose from the defendant's particular contact with the forum
state.14
3
The authority to exercise personal jurisdiction is determined by a two-
part test:'- (i) whether a state's long-arm statute reaches the nonresident
defendant' 45 and (2) whether the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction is
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,'
46
i.e., whether "the conduct satisfies the 'minimum contacts' requirement of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
47
Courts have also applied this two-part test to determine whether a
spammer-defendant's conduct is sufficient for the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction.148
This same test has been applied in the realm of UCE. For example,
in Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks,'49 the district court examined whether it
could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident sender of UCE.'50
The court found that the "state's long arm statute must be satisfied and
exercise of personal jurisdiction" must be consistent with due process.' 5'
A. State Long-Arm Statutes
All states have long-arm statutes or court rules that provide courts with per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.'S2 While the limits of those
Boundary ofMinimum Contacts Limitedto a Web Site, 15J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819,
823 (1997). Limitations on the exercise of personal jurisdiction differ depending on wheth-
er the court seeks to exercise general or specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
General jurisdiction arises from a defendant's substantial in-state contacts. As a result of these
contacts, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any claim, even if the particular claim
does not arise from the substantial contacts of the defendant with the forum state. Id. at n. 17.
However, "[sipecific jurisdiction.., arises out of a single act by the defendant and is jurisdic-
tion that extends to the limits of minimum contacts." Id. at n. 18.
143 Id. at 8z3 n. 18.
144 See Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Miss. 2001).
145 Id.
146 Id.; see also Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
147 Ensign-Bickford Co. v. ICI Explosives USA Inc., 817 E Supp. ioi8, 1026 (D. Conn.
1993).
148 See Internet Doorway, Inc., 138 F Supp. 2d at 774, 780 (denying defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on claims of violation of the Latham Act and
trespass to chattels).
149 Id. at 773 (plaintiffs sued based on the Latham Act and trespass to chattels).
150 Id. at 775.
151 Alongi, supra note 52, at 281. A Virginia court also examined the issue of personal
jurisdiction in Verizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 6oi (E.D. Va. 2002) and
found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not offend due process.
152 See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the
Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV. 491 , 496 (2o04).
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statutes may vary, over half of the states extend personal jurisdiction to any
length that does not offend due process.'
5 3
In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,154 a Connecticut corporation
sued a Massachusetts corporation in federal district court. Under the Con-
necticut long-arm statute' 55 then in force, a foreign corporation was "sub-
ject to suit in this state... if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited busi-
ness, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or
without the state." 16 The court held that jurisdiction under the long-arm
statute was satisfied based on the defendant's Internet advertisements.,7
When spammers are not physically present in or a resident of the forum
state, courts of the state may use the state's long-arm statute to exercise
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the statute and due process in order
to reach out of state and compel a nonresident defendant to defend against
a lawsuit.' 5 When the state's long-arm statute is satisfied, the analysis turns
to whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with due pro-
cess.
B. Due Process-Traditional Minimum Contacts and the Internet
In determining whether personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
is consistent with due process, the court must find three elements: "(i) the
defendant must have sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the forum state,
(2) the claim asserted against the defendant must arise out of those con-
tacts, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable."'' 59 In fulfilling
these requirements, the Supreme Court has said that "it is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."'6 When these three ele-
153 See id. at 496-97 (noting that six states have long-arm statutes that extend to the
boundaries of due process, thirteen states amended an "enumerated acts" statute so that the
statute reaches to the limits of due process, and twelve states with "enumerated acts" statutes
have had their statute declared to reach to the bounds of due process by their respective state
courts).
154 Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
155 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411 (C)(2) (repealed 1997).
156 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-411 (C)(2) (repealed 1997).
157 See Inset Sys., Inc., 937 E Supp. at 164 (stating that "advertising via the Internet is
solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature to satisfy... the Connecticut long-arm statute").
158 See Stott, supra note 142, at 823.
159 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 E Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
16o Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (958) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310,319 (945)).
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ments are satisfied, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant.
16'
i. Nonresident defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state. -The plaintiff in a civil suit must show how the defendant purpose-
fully availed itself of the privilege of conducting its Internet activities in
the forum state. 62 This question goes to "whether the 'defendant purpose-
fully established' contacts with the forum state."' 63
Purposeful availment may be a difficult standard to meet when a de-
fendant has sent millions of e-mails all over the world, including e-mails to
residents of the forum state. Courts have read this requirement narrowly:
[Tihe owner of a website can have some contact with people and entities
within a given forum state without taking any purposive step towards the
residents of that state or even knowing that a contact has been made. Even
sending an e-mail requires some purposive step towards a particular indi-
vidual, but that often will not be sufficient to constitute purposeful avail-
ment.,64
In determining whether a defendant's contacts are sufficient to find that
he purposefully availed himself of the laws and protections of the forum
state in a case involving the Internet, a variety of factors come into play.
The court is forced to weigh these factors in making its decision.
Factors weighing in favor of exercising persona/jurisdiction
(1) income being generated for the defendant through Internet
contacts with residents of the forum state;
(2) knowledge by the defendant that the Internet activity will
do substantial damage to the plaintiff in the forum state;
(3) the maintenance of a website that produces a high number
of "hits" by residents of the forum state;
(4) indiscriminate responses by the defendant to every e-mail
sent to the website;
(5) the presence of website content indicating that the website
is targeting an audience that includes the forum state, and
161 See Stott, supra note 142, at 825-26.
162 See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1073.1 (3d ed. 2002) (stating "the analysis applicable to a case involving juris-
diction based on the Internet (or any other modern technology) should not be different at its
most basic level from any other personal jurisdiction case").
163 Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 E Supp. at 1123 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462,475 (1985)).
164 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 162.
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(6) the Internet service provider being located in the forum
state.165
Factors weighing against exercising persona/jurisdiction
(1) use of disclaimers, such as that the website is intended for
a limited audience;
(2) statements posted on the website directed only at resi-
dents of a limited geographic area;
(3) designing the site so that it will not interact with users of
the forum state;
(4) a self description of or notice on the website to the effect
that it is only "informational";
(5) the absence of evidence of the website being contacted by
residents of the forum state; and
(6) the use of forum-selection or choice- of-law agreements
that specify a state other than the forum state selected by
the plaintiff.'6
2. Claim asserted against the defendant must arise out of defendant's contacts
with the forum state. -This question involves an analysis of the defendant's
contacts with the forum state and whether the plaintiff's cause of action
arises out of those forum-related contacts.'6 7 The plaintiff must demon-
strate that the cause of action arose from defendant's activities in the forum
state; a defendant's physical presence in the jurisdiction is not necessary to
establish this prong.'"
3. Exercise of personaljurisdiction over defendant must be reasonable.- In the
third prong of the analysis, the court must be satisfied that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, based on the contacts that the
defendant has with the forum state, is fair and reasonable. 369
The issue of fair and reasonable exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant in a case involving the Internet was addressed in
EDIAS Software Int'l v. BASIS Int'l Ltd. 70 The plaintiff software company
filed an action in the plaintiff's home state, claiming defamation and libel,
165 Id.
i66 Id.
167 See id.
I68 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985) (stating that "[slo long
as a commercial actor's efforts are 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we
have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction").
169 See WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 162.
170 EDIAS Software Int'l v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., 947 F Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
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based on e-mails sent by the defendant and a press release posted on the
defendant's website.I7 ' In finding that personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant was fair and reasonable, the court said that the defendant "should not
be permitted to take advantage of modern technology through an Internet
Web page and forum and simultaneously escape traditional notions of juris-
diction." 171 Courts could also look to the number of hits a webpage receives
from residents of a forum state, and to other evidence that Internet activity
was directed at the forum state.
C. Application of Minimum Contacts Test to Website Operators: Zippo
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.'73 is one of the leading cases
dealing with personal jurisdiction and the Internet. 74 Zippo Manufactur-
ing sued Zippo Dot Com under, interalia, the Federal Trademark Act.' 75 In
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
the court set the foundation for how future courts would analyze whether
a defendant website operator had sufficient minimum contacts with a fo-
rum state to justify exercising personal jurisdiction over him.176 The issue
was whether the website operator's contacts with the forum state, via the
Internet, were sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement of
due process.'
77
In Zippo, United States District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin synthesized
the due process minimum contacts analysis into a sliding scale of activity
for differentiating among several levels of contact that an operator of an
Internet website may have with a particular forum state.' 78 The underly-
ing rationale of the scale is an attempt to create a balancing standard that
reflects "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."'79
Under this analysis, the court determines whether the website is active,
interactive, or passive.'18 One end of the spectrum consists of active web-
sites, such as those in which the website operator conducts business trans-
actions over the Internet: "[i]f the defendant enters into contracts with
residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated
171 Id. at 414-1 5.
172 Id. at 420.
173 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. I 119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
174 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 162.
175 Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at I 121.
176 See WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 162.
177 See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 E Supp. at 1124.
178 See id.
179 Id.
18o Id.
[Vol. 94
CAN-SPAM ACT
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper."', Passive websites occupy the opposite end of the spectrum and
are characterized as "situations where a defendant has simply posted infor-
mation on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign ju-
risdictions."18 2 Given that the passive website "does little more than make
information available to those who are interested,"'83 an operator of a pas-
sive website does not establish sufficient contacts as grounds for exercising
personal jurisdiction.'8 4
Somewhere between active and passive websites lies the middle ground
referred to as interactive websites' s5 that allow users to exchange informa-
tion with a host computer,16 but the interaction does not rise to the level of
continuous and systematic operations that would typify an active website.
If the court finds that a defendant operates an interactive website, the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction is "determined by examining the level of interactivity
and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs in the
Web site." 187
Even though the scale has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court
as the definitive test for personal jurisdiction over defendants who operate
Internet websites, Judge McLaughlin's sliding scale is one way to visualize
the continuum of personal jurisdiction and the Internet.," While the scale
was originally developed to analyze personal jurisdiction issues regarding
defendants who operate websites, it is possible that the same scale may be
applied to analyze whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant-spammer under the CAN-SPAM Act. As a result, the sliding
scale analysis promulgated in Zippo can provide several avenues for resolv-
ing one of the CAN-SPAM Act's most criticized flaws: the lack of a process
to gain personal jurisdiction over a spammer.
D. Application of Minimum-Contacts Test to Spammers
i. Sliding Scale Approach.-In applying Zippo's sliding scale analysis to de-
fendant-spammers, the difficult issue will be determining whether certain
activities specific to spamming will be characterized as "active spamming"
or "passive spamming."
18I Id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 E3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 162.
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While case law is obviously needed to develop this analysis, in light of
the factors discussed in Part V.B.i,' sg. the Zippo sliding scale '9° and subse-
quent cases construing the scale; '9' the following characteristics might be a
way of categorizing a defendant spammer's contacts with the forum state:
(a) how the spammer obtained the recipients' e-mail addresses; (b) wheth-
er, and to what extent, the spammer has entered into contracts with e-mail.
recipients from the forum state; (c) whether, and to what extent, the spam-
mer has derived financial benefit from residents of the forum state; and (d)
whether, and to what extent, the spammer has concentrated his efforts in
one state. The goal of this analysis will be to develop factors that will make
the nonresident defendant-spammer appear more like the operator of an
"active" website as opposed to factors that make him appear more like a
"passive" website operator.
Many courts have held that a website will be deemed "active" when
it advertises goods and services and provides some mechanism for Inter-
net consumers to actually enter into contracts with the nonresident de-
fendant.92 The degree of active solicitation by the website operator and
whether the website provides a mechanism for allowing Internet consum-
ers to buy goods and services seems to be a strong indication that the web-
site is active and thus exercising personal jurisdiction would be permitted.
In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,193 the court found that the website was a
passive homepage and that there were no deliberate, directed merchandis-
ing efforts toward the state.' 94 Thus, a critical distinction is whether, and
to what extent, the nonresident defendant is soliciting and actually doing
business over the Internet with residents of the forum state.
Similar distinctions may be relevant in analyzing a spammer's activities.
The fact that a defendant spammer actually benefits from his UCE will be
a strong indication that the defendant has minimum contacts, such as when
the UCE actually leads to a commercial transaction. The more transactions
that the spammer enters based on his UCE, the more active the spammer
appears. The strongest indication of whether the spammer has minimum
189 See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
19o See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952E Supp. at 1124.
191 See Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F3d 704, 711 (8th Cit. 2003) (failing to adopt
the sliding scale for a case of general jurisdiction); Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst
Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 E3d 390,400 (4th Cir. 2003) (affirming trial court's dismissal for lack
of personal jurisdiction stating "in order for [the defendant's] website to bring [the defendant]
within the jurisdiction of the Maryland courts, the company must have done something more
than merely place information on the Internet"); DakColl Inc. v. Grand Cent. Graphics, Inc.,
352 E Supp. 2d 990, 997 (D.N.D. 2005) (holding that defendant's website that had "a very
high level of interactivity" was sufficient for exercising personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant).
192 See Zippo Afg. Co., 95z F Supp. at 1124.
193 Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 13o F3d 414, 419 (9th Cit. 1997).
194 Id. at 419.
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contacts would be the number of e-mail messages the spammer directs to-
ward a given forum. However, if the spammer does not appear to target any
forum in particular, derives no financial benefit from the spam, and sends a
low number of messages, then the spammer seems more passive.
Just as the Cybersell court focused on the extent to which a website op-
erator actually enters into contracts with consumers in the particular forum
state for determining whether the website is active, interactive or passive,
this same factor would carry some weight in the context of spam. However,
this factor should not be determinative when dealing with a defendant-
spammer because it fails to address the main problem of UCE: the sheer
fact that spain is a costly nuisance. Thus, more weight should be given to
the extent to which a spammer sends out UCE to a forum state than to the
extent to which residents of the forum state actually buy the products be-
ing sold in the e-mail.
In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.1gs the court found that "ad-
vertising via the Internet is solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature to
satisfy" Connecticut's long-arm statute and due process.' 96 In support of its
finding that the defendant, a Massachusetts corporation, had established
minimum contacts, the court reasoned that the defendant had purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business within the forum state be-
cause the Internet advertisements reached as many as io,ooo users in Con-
necticut (the number of Internet access sites in Connecticut) and because
an online advertisement is continuously available to any Internet user.
97
2. Creating a New Minimum Contacts Analysis for Defendant-Spammer and the
Internet. -Internet activity will likely continue to grow. Without additional
congressional legislation or a decisive Supreme Court case, personal juris-
diction and Internet activity will continue to be in flux, particularly with
regards to the CAN-SPAM Act and spamming. While the CAN-SPAM Act
is clearly a step towards regulating spam, it needs to be strengthened by
supplemental legislation that will confer some basis for allowing small ISPs
to bring suit against defendants in the ISP's state, instead of allowing spam-
mers to be shielded by due process protections.' gs Until new legislation
or a Supreme Court case endorses one standard, the number of standards
construing when personal jurisdiction is appropriate with regard to Internet
activities will continue to increase and confuse the courts.
195 Inset Sys. Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
196 Id. at 164.
197 Id. at 165.
198 See supra notes 142-72 and accompanying text.
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VI. THE FUTURE OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT
While this Note has focused on two of the primary criticisms of the CAN-
SPAM Act that the literature has acknowledged but never attempted to
provide a remedy for, there are other criticisms of the Act that have re-
ceived significant attention in the literature and therefore were given little
attention in this Note. Some critics, for instance, argue that the federal gov-
ernment acted too quickly by not providing enough time for states to serve
as the laboratories "without risk to the rest of the country."'99
Some authors have criticized the CAN-SPAM Act because it actually
legalizes some spam as long as the spam follows the guidelines of the Act.
2 °
Experts claim that there "will be a lot more spam by legitimate marketers
because they will be able to point to the federal law and say, 'We are fol-
lowing all the rules. ' ' 0° The CAN-SPAM Act applies only to unsolicited,
commerctial e-mail messages which are primarily for advertisement of goods
or services"' and therefore does not apply to other forms of spain such as
political e-mail; the Act does not prohibit the sending of all unsolicited
commercial e-mail but is focused on certain fraudulent and misleading
practices. °3
Some have criticized the CAN-SPAM Act because it removed regula-
tion of spam from the states before the most effective solution could be
found, 2 4 and, in doing so, preempted stronger state laws,o5 such as the laws
199 See Alongi, supra note 52, at z88; see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
200 See Alongi, supra note 52, at 288.
201 David Firestone & Saul Hansell, Senate Votes to Crack Down on Some Span, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2003,availableathttp://web.mit.edu/zIw.784/www/BD%2oSupplementals/Materials/
Unit%2oTwo/Spam/senate%2ocontra%2oSpam%2onyt.html (quoting David Sorkin). See also
Jacquelyn Trussell, Student Article, Is the CAN-SPAM Act the Answer to the Growing Problem of
Spam?, 16 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 175, 187 (2004) ("By regulating spam, the CAN-SPAM Act
legitimizes certain types of spam. Many fear that a wave of legitimate spam will be unleashed
from companies that previously feared being labeled as spammers.").
202 Glenn B. Manishin & Stephanie A. Joyce, Overview of Current Spare Law & Policy, in
COMPLYING WITH THE CAN-SPAM ACT AND OTHER CRITICAL BUSINESS ISSUES: STAYING OUT OF
TROUBLE 9, 13-14 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2004).
203 Shirin Malkani et al., Understanding the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, in INSTITUTE ON
PRIVACY LAW (5TH ANNUAL): NEW DEVELOPMENTS & COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN A SECURITY-
CONSCIOUS WORLD 482, 483 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2004).
204 See Alongi, supra note 52, at z88 (discussing how states are analogous to "many labo-
ratories" where various solutions could be tested).
205 See Jeremiah Kelman, Note, E-Nuisance: Unsolicited Bulk E-Mail at the Boundaries of
Common Law Property Rights, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 375 (2004); see also Grant Gross, Is CAN-
SPAM Working?; One year after it went into effect, many say the nation ' antispam law is ineffective,
PC WORLD, Dec. 28, 2004, http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/o,aid, I 19058,oo.asp (discuss-
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enacted in California and Virginia. While the exact scope of this preemp-
tion is unclear,06 the Act expressly "supersedes any statute, regulation or
rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates
the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, ' ' 207 but it does not
preempt general state laws regarding trespass, contract or tort, or laws that
relate to acts of fraud or computer crime. °i
The California statute,2 °9 which would have gone into effect in January
2004 but was instead preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act, required spam-
mers to obtain consent before sending spam to any recipients, essentially
creating an "opt-in" scheme .210 However, the CAN-SPAM Act takes a more
spam-friendly approach by requiring senders of UCE to provide recipients
with an opt-out mechanism: a "clear and conspicuous notice of the oppor-
tunity... to decline to receive further commercial electronic mail messages
from the sender."2 The California statute provided another invaluable
mechanism for enforcement that the CAN-SPAM Act neglected to adopt:
a private right of action to allow spam recipients to bring suit for damages,
up to $i million per incident, plus attorney fees and costs.". , The CAN-
SPAM Act also "preempted a Virginia statute that went into effect in July
2003 that made it a felony to send bulk e-mails that disguise their origins
or return addresses."'3 Obviously, the prospect of a felony conviction and a
prison sentence could have proven more of a deterrent than CAN-SPAM's
monetary damages.
While the CAN-SPAM Act certainly has critics, the Act has had some
success in suits against spanmers. In March 2004, the Anti-Spam Alliance,
made up of four of the largest ISPs in the United States-America On-
line, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Earthlink-filed six lawsuits in multiple states
against several hundred defendants, basing their suits on the CAN-SPAM
Act.214 The alliance filed a second round of suits in October 2004.215
ing Laura Atkins,' President of the SpamCon Foundation, assertion that the CAN-SPAM
Act "hurt spain-fighting efforts by pre-empting parts of some tougher state laws, including a
California opt-in requirement").
2o6 See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
207 15 U.S.C.S. § 7707(b)(I) (2005).
208 § 7707(b)(2).
209 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.2 (West 2003).
210 Id. at § 17529.2(a)-(b).
211 15 U.S.C.S. § 7704(a)(5)(A)(ii) (2005).
212 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529.5 (West 2003); see also Alongi, supra note 52, at
287-88.
213 Alongi,supra note 52, at 287. "On December ii, 2003, Virginia brought its first felony
indictment against two alleged spammers who face possible penalties of five years in prison
and fines of $2500 each." Id.
214 Marguerite Reardon, Major ISPs Unite in Spam Fight, CNET NEWS.cOM, Mar. 1o, 2004,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009-22-5 I 72038.html.
215 Marguerite Reardon, New Round of Spain Suits from AOL, Microsoft, Yahoo, CNEr
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VII. CONCLUSION
The CAN-SPAM Act clearly has problems, which have been well docu-
mented. In fact, up to this point, the Act's potential uses have been over-
shadowed by criticisms of its failings. While recognizing the criticisms and
the faults of the CAN-SPAM Act, this Note evaluates these drawbacks and
attempts to demonstrate some benefits of the Act by using current case
law and analogies of spain to other electronic communications under the
TCPA and situations where personal jurisdiction was found against website
operators.
Given the nature of the Internet and the easy access that spammers
have to anyone's e-mail inbox, it is doubtful that U.S. federal antispam
legislation will end spam. However, the Act does provide the first federal
cause of action for UCE and has had some success. While the CAN-SPAM
Act has not canned spam, further legislation and clever analogies by law-
yers will prove that the CAN-SPAM Act provides a solid foundation in the
fight against spam.
NEws.coM, Oct. 28, 2004, http://news.com.com/New+ round+of+spam+ suits+from+AOL%2
C+M icrosoft%2C+Yahoo/2 I 00-I 038-3-543 1 002.html?tag=st.rc.targ-mb.
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